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CLONING MIRANDA: WHY MEDICAL MIRANDA
SUPPORTS THE PRE-ASSERTION OF CRIMINAL
MIRANDA RIGHTS
COLIN MILLER*
Courts across the country have concluded that suspects cannot assert
their Miranda rights before being subjected to custodial interrogation. This
reluctance to credit pre-assertions can be traced to dicta from McNeil v.
Wisconsin, in which the Supreme Court noted that “[m]ost rights must be
asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against.”
This Article challenges this notion by drawing an analogy between criminal
suspects and patients. In 1990, Congress passed the Patient
Self-Determination Act (“PSDA”), the so-called “medical Miranda,” which
requires health care providers who accept money from Medicaid or
Medicare to inform patients of their rights regarding advance directives and
the refusal of medical treatment prior to admission.
The goal of the PSDA is to inform patients of their health care rights
prior to admission so that they can assert those rights before being pressed
into an unfamiliar environment in which they face possible isolation and
coercion. This Article contends that the same principles that led to the
passage of the PSDA support the ability of suspects to be able to pre-assert
their Miranda rights when custodial interrogation is “imminent.” It also sets
up a framework for determining whether a suspect properly pre-asserted his
Miranda rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Demetrius Wilson was a suspect in the fatal shooting of Reginald
Knox, and Detective Brian Krueger “put out word” that he wanted to
interview Wilson.1 Wilson’s stepfather contacted Krueger and arranged
for Wilson to come to the police station with relatives for an interview.2
While being interviewed at the police station, Wilson made a first
statement in which he claimed he shot Knox because Knox was robbing
him at gunpoint.3 Police officers then accompanied Wilson and his
1.
2.
3.

Wilson v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 175, 177 (Ky. 2006).
Id.
Id.
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relatives to the crime scene, where Wilson walked them through his
version of events.4 The officers (1) responded that his story was not
consistent with the evidence; and (2) lied to him by telling him that
video cameras recorded the shooting.5 The officers suggested that
Wilson and his relatives talk things over at lunch and return to the
police station in the afternoon.6
Upon returning to the police station, Wilson’s stepfather told
Detective Krueger that the family consulted with a lawyer, who told
Wilson not to speak to police.7 Wilson then told a police officer “that if
the police wished to speak with him, they should contact his attorney.”8
Upon these words leaving Wilson’s lips, he was immediately arrested
and taken to an interview room.9 There, Wilson was read his Miranda
rights, said he understood them, and gave an incriminatory statement
that was inconsistent with his first statement.10
The court denied Wilson’s motion to suppress his second
statement, and he was eventually convicted of murder.11 Wilson
appealed, claiming he validly invoked his Miranda rights prior to
giving his second statement, meaning the statement was inadmissible
under the Miranda right to counsel.12 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
agreed that the second statement would be inadmissible if Wilson
properly invoked his Miranda rights;13 however, the court concluded
that Wilson’s Miranda right to counsel had not yet attached because his
request for an attorney was made before he was subjected to custodial
interrogation.14 As support, the court cited the following dicta from the
Supreme Court’s opinion in McNeil v. Wisconsin15:
We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his
Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than
“custodial interrogation” . . . . Most rights must be asserted
when the government seeks to take the action they protect
against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to
counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
501 U.S. 171 (1991).
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custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will
allow it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial
interrogation, with similar future effect.16

The court thereafter laid out a laundry list of other court opinions
from around the country, each of which also cited this dicta from
McNeil to conclude that a suspect cannot invoke Miranda “rights unless
he or she is subject to custodial interrogation.”17
The thesis of this Article is that, contrary to the conventional
wisdom, suspects should be able to pre-assert their Miranda rights.
This Article advances this thesis by reference to the Patient
Self-Determination Act (“PSDA”), the so-called “medical Miranda,”
which requires all health care providers who accept money from
Medicaid or Medicare to inform patients of their rights regarding
advance directives and the refusal of medical treatment prior to
admission in health care facilities. Specifically, this Article contends
that the same policy goals that allow and even encourage patients to
pre-assert their medical Miranda rights militate in favor of recognizing
pre-assertion of criminal Miranda rights. Moreover, this Article argues
that courts should determine whether custodial interrogation is
“imminent” and thus conducive to pre-assertion of Miranda rights by
applying the same “totality of the circumstances” test they use to decide
whether police officers can pre-administer the Miranda warning.
Section I looks at the Miranda opinion and the subsequent
Supreme Court opinions expanding and narrowing its scope. Section II
analyzes the PSDA and the reasons why Congress thought it made
sense to inform patients of the ability to execute advance directives
before being admitted into health care facilities. Finally, Section III
argues that the same principles that led to the passage of the PSDA
support the ability of suspects to be able to pre-assert their Miranda
rights when custodial interrogation is “imminent.” The Article
concludes by setting up a framework for determining whether a suspect
properly pre-asserted his Miranda rights.
I. MIRANDA AND ITS PROGENY
A. Miranda and Fifth Amendment Rights
The Supreme Court’s 1966 opinion in Miranda v. Arizona18
resolved four consolidated cases.19 In all four cases, police officers
16.
17.
18.

Wilson, 199 S.W.3d at 178–79 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3).
Id. at 179.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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interrogated suspects without first informing them of their right to
remain silent and their right to counsel.20 The four suspects each
claimed that their interrogations violated the Fifth Amendment’s
requirement that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”21
The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that “the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination.”22 The Court then defined “custodial interrogation”
as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.”23 According to the Court, before subjecting a
suspect to such custodial interrogation, law enforcement officers must
adhere to the following procedural safeguard or its functional
equivalent: “the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.”24
In response to this Miranda warning, the suspect can voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waive these rights.25 If, however, the
suspect indicates that he wishes to speak with an attorney, the
interrogation cannot proceed.26 Moreover, if the suspect is alone and
invokes his right to remain silent by stating that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the officers cannot question him.27
B. Michigan v. Mosley and the Right to Remain Silent
Nine years later, in 1975, the Supreme Court was confronted with
the question of whether law enforcement officers can re-administer the
Miranda warning and interrogate a suspect who has already invoked his

19.
Id. at 491–98.
20.
See id. One of these suspects, Ernesto Miranda, was charged with
kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery. Two police officers put Miranda in an
interrogation room and emerged with a written confession two hours later without any
indication they had informed him of his constitutional rights. See id. at 491–92.
21.
Id. at 442, 491.
22.
Id. at 444.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 444–45.
27.
Id. at 445.
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right to remain silent. In Michigan v. Mosley,28 Detective James Cowie
arrested Richard Mosley in connection with a string of robberies and
read him the Miranda warning.29 After Cowie began interrogating him,
Mosley stated that he did not want to answer any questions about the
robberies.30 Cowie ceased questioning Mosley and took him to the cell
block.31
Over two hours later, a different detective took Mosley to the
Homicide Bureau and read him the Miranda warning.32 Mosley
indicated that he understood the warning, and the detective proceeded
to question him about a murder.33 After first denying his involvement,
Mosley incriminated himself in the homicide.34 Upon being charged
with first-degree murder, Mosley moved to suppress his confession, but
the trial court denied the motion.35 Following his ensuing conviction,
Mosley appealed, claiming that the admission of his confession violated
the Miranda doctrine.36
The Supreme Court noted “that the admissibility of statements
obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent
depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’
was ‘scrupulously honored.’”37 Applying this standard, the Court
concluded that Mosley’s right to cut off questioning was, in fact
scrupulously honored.38 According to the Court, after Mosley initially
asserted his right to remain silent, “the police here immediately ceased
the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a
significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings,
and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a
subject of the earlier interrogation.”39

28.
423 U.S. 96 (1975).
29.
Id. at 97.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 97–98.
33.
Id. at 98.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 98–99.
36.
Id. at 99.
37.
Id. at 104 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 479 (1966)).
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 106. Many courts have referred to these four factors as the Mosley
factors. See, e.g., State v. Hartwig, 366 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Wis. 1985). These factors,
however, are not to be “woodenly applied,” and none of them alone is dispositive on
the issue of whether a suspect’s right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. Id.;
see, e.g., Grant v. Warden, Maine State Prison, 616 F.3d 72, 77 (1st Cir. 2010).
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C. Edwards v. Arizona and the Edwards Prophylaxis
Another six years later, the Supreme Court was confronted with a
similar question: can law enforcement officers re-administer the
Miranda warning and interrogate a suspect who has already invoked his
Miranda right to counsel? This time, however, the result was very
different. In Edwards v. Arizona,40 Robert Edwards was charged with
robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder.41 During custodial
interrogation and after being read the Miranda warning, Edwards
expressed interest in making a deal, prompting the interrogating officer
to give him the county attorney’s phone number.42 Edwards dialed the
number before quickly hanging up and saying, “I want an attorney
before making a deal.”43 The officer responded by taking Edwards to
the county jail.44
The next morning, a guard informed Edwards that two detectives
wished to speak to him, prompting Edwards to respond that he did not
want to talk with anyone.45 The guard responded that Edwards had to
talk to the detectives.46 Edwards thereafter met with the detectives, who
read him the Miranda warning and played him the taped statement of an
alleged accomplice who had implicated him.47 Edwards then agreed to
speak and incriminated himself.48 Edwards moved to suppress his
confession, but the trial court denied the motion, concluding that his
statement was voluntary.49
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding “that when
an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.”50 The
Court further found that a suspect who has “expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 478–79.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 484.
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him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police.”51
The Supreme Court has subsequently referred to this holding as
the “Edwards prophylaxis” because it is a judicially crafted,
non-constitutional rule rather than one that is constitutionally required.52
In other words, this prophylaxis is merely a “rule established to protect
the Fifth Amendment based Miranda right to . . . counsel” and not part
of the Miranda right itself.53 Under this prophylaxis, the defendant’s
subsequent waiver of his right to counsel is presumed to be involuntary
and the result of the inherently compelling pressures of custodial
interrogation.54 Because this presumption is merely a prophylaxis,
either the Supreme Court or a lower court can decide to expand it to
different factual contexts.55 That said, because the Edwards rule is
prophylactic, a court can extend it to cover additional situations only
after balancing benefits against costs and determining whether the
extension serves its prophylactic purpose.56
D. Pre-Assertion of Miranda Rights
1. MCNEIL V. WISCONSIN AND THE DICTA ON PRE-ASSERTION
A decade later, in McNeil v. Wisconsin, the defendant asked the
Supreme Court to extend the Edwards prophylaxis. In McNeil, Paul
McNeil was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery.57 When two
Milwaukee County deputy sheriffs read McNeil the Miranda warning
and sought to interrogate him, he refused to answer any questions but
did not ask for an attorney.58 At his initial appearance/bail hearing,
McNeil requested and was appointed a public defender.59 After his bail
hearing, McNeil was incarcerated, and Detective Joseph Butts visited
him on three occasions over the next four days to talk about a murder,

51.
Id. at 484–85.
52.
See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 116 (2010) (citing the
“Edwards prophylaxis”).
53.
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 787 (2009).
54.
Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 115–16.
55.
See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 780 P.2d 844, 850 (Wash. 1989) (en banc)
(“Stewart requests this court to extend the Edwards prophylactic rule in order to shield
his custodial confession that occurred following the invocation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel at an arraignment on an unrelated charge.”).
56.
Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106–09.
57.
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 173 (1991).
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
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an attempted murder, and an armed burglary in Caledonia.60 Each time,
Butts read McNeil the Miranda warning, and, each time, McNeil
signed a Miranda waiver.61 During Butts’ third visit, McNeil made an
incriminatory statement while Butts interrogated him.62
The next day, McNeil was charged with the Caledonia crimes.63
He moved to suppress his confession, but the trial court denied the
motion.64 After being convicted, McNeil appealed, claiming that his
courtroom appearance with counsel constituted invocation of his
Miranda right to counsel.65
The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering the right to
counsel contained in the Sixth Amendment, which states in relevant part
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”66 The
Court noted that this Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
offense-specific and only attaches when a prosecution is commenced via
a “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.”67 Therefore, McNeil’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had only attached in connection with the armed robbery and had not yet
attached in connection with the Caledonia crimes.68
McNeil, however, claimed that his invocation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in connection with the armed robbery
charge also constituted “an invocation of the non-offense-specific
Miranda–Edwards right.”69 The Court agreed that the Miranda right to
counsel “is not offense specific: Once a suspect invokes the Miranda
right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be
reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present.”70 The
Court, however, disagreed with the argument that invocation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel implies invocation of the
Miranda/Fifth Amendment right to counsel; instead, it concluded that
“[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel
present concerning many matters, but not the matter under
prosecution.”71 Moreover, the Court admonished that invocation of the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 173–74.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
Id. (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)).
Id. at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id. (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988)).
Id. at 178.

872

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Miranda right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that
can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the
assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the
police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail hearing does
not bear that construction.”72
McNeil nonetheless contended that the Court should still find
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel implied invocation
of the Miranda right to counsel as a matter of sound policy.73 In other
words, McNeil asked the Court to extend the Edwards prophylaxis.74
The Court refused, finding that “if we were to adopt petitioner’s rule,
most persons in pretrial custody for serious offenses would be
unapproachable by police officers suspecting them of involvement in
other crimes, even though they have never expressed any unwillingness
to be questioned.”75
After rejecting this argument, the McNeil majority addressed the
dissent in a footnote that was partially quoted in the introduction to this
Article:
The dissent predicts that the result in this case will routinely
be circumvented when, “[i]n future preliminary hearings,
competent counsel . . . make sure that they, or their clients,
make a statement on the record” invoking the Miranda right
to counsel. We have in fact never held that a person can
invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other
than “custodial interrogation”—which a preliminary hearing
will not always, or even usually, involve. If the Miranda right
to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could
be argued, there is no logical reason why it could not be
invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to
identification as a suspect. Most rights must be asserted when
the government seeks to take the action they protect against.
The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel,
once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial
interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it
to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial
interrogation, with similar future effect. Assuming, however,
that an assertion at arraignment would be effective, and would
be routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the
principle of our decisions will not have substantial
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 181–82.
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consequences is no reason to abandon that principle. It would
remain intolerable that a person in custody who had expressed
no objection to being questioned would be unapproachable.76
2. MCNEIL’S AFTERMATH AND THE ADOPTION OF THE
PRE-ASSERTION DICTA
In the aftermath of McNeil, courts across the country correctly
concluded that this footnote was dicta.77 In McNeil, the Court
determined that McNeil did not make any statement during his bail
hearing that could “reasonably be construed to be an expression of a
desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial
interrogation by the police.”78 Therefore, the McNeil majority’s
speculation about whether a suspect can assert his Miranda rights
anticipatorily and in a context other than custodial interrogation was
unnecessary to its opinion.79
That said, while courts have construed this footnote as dicta, they
have also categorically applied it to invalidate pre-assertions of Miranda
rights. For instance, in State v. Relford,80 police officers believed that
Charles Relford committed a homicide and interrogated him after
reading him the Miranda warning.81 At the end of this interrogation, the
officers arrested Relford and transported him to jail.82 The following
day, a sergeant told Relford about telephone restrictions at the jail and
asked him if he wanted to speak to a lawyer.83 Relford answered that
“he needed the public defender.”84 The sergeant responded that “a
public defender would have to be appointed to him by the Court,
however, if he wanted to call them, there was the phone, and I would
provide the phone number for him.”85 Relford did not follow up on his
request, but the police did follow up with Relford the next day,
securing his confession after reading him the Miranda warning.86

76.
Id. at 182 n.3 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 184
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
77.
See, e.g., Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1246 (3d Cir. 1994).
78.
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
79.
Redman, 34 F.3d at 1246 (“[T]his passage in McNeil is essentially dicta,
being a response to a hypothetical posed by the dissent . . . .”).
80.
623 N.W.2d 343, 344 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001).
81.
Id. at 344–45.
82.
Id. at 344.
83.
Id. at 345.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 344–45.
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Relford was later charged with murder and moved to suppress his
confession.87 The district court agreed with Relford, finding that his
statement that “he needed the public defender” was an unequivocal and
unambiguous invocation of his Miranda right to counsel.88 But the
Court of Appeals of Nebraska reversed, citing the aforementioned
footnote from McNeil.89
The Nebraska court was not alone in citing McNeil; it noted that
“[m]any state courts which have considered the issue have relied on the
language in McNeil v. Wisconsin, to hold that one cannot anticipatorily
invoke the Miranda right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation.”90
Moreover, “relying on McNeil v. Wisconsin, an overwhelming number
of federal courts have also held that a defendant cannot invoke his
Miranda rights outside the context of custodial interrogation.”91
While McNeil only involved the alleged assertion of the Miranda
right to counsel, courts have also used it to defeat claims by suspects
that they asserted their right to remain silent prior to custodial
interrogation. For example, in Barnett v. State,92 Dustin Barnett
voluntarily went to the police station where Detective Curtis Lampert
took him to an interrogation room before telling him that he did not
have to talk with police and that he was free to leave.93 Barnett
responded that he wanted to leave and did not want to talk.94 Detective
Lampert responded by leaving the room, returning a few minutes later,
and telling Barnett that he was no longer free to leave.95 Lampert later
read Barnett the Miranda warning and interrogated him, resulting in
Barnett making a number of incriminatory statements.96
After he was charged with first-degree murder with a deadly
weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon, Barnett unsuccessfully
moved to suppress his statements and was convicted.97 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Nevada cited McNeil for the proposition that
Miranda rights cannot be asserted anticipatorily.98 Therefore, the court
found no constitutional violation because “Barnett’s initial invocation of
87.
88.
89.
(1991)).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 346, 349 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3
Id. at 347 (citation omitted) (collecting cases).
Id. at 348 (citation omitted) (collecting cases).
No. 61083, 2013 WL 7155560 (Nev. Dec. 18, 2013).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991)).
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his right to remain silent occurred before Miranda circumstances even
existed.”99
II. THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT
A. Cruzan and the Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,100 Nancy
Cruzan was rendered incompetent and dependent on life support as the
result of an automobile accident.101 Thereafter, her parents and
coguardians moved for “a court order directing the withdrawal of their
daughter’s artificial feeding and hydration equipment after it became
apparent that she had virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive
faculties.”102 The Supreme Court of Missouri denied their request,
concluding that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Cruzan would have wanted life support withdrawn under the
present circumstances.103
In addressing this issue on appeal in June 1990, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that “the common-law doctrine of informed
consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent
individual to refuse medical treatment.”104 The Court was able to infer
this “constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment” by considering both the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause and prior precedent regarding the right to bodily
integrity.105 That said, the Court found no problem with Missouri
enacting a procedural safeguard that surrogates seeking to withdraw life
support must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
incompetent patient would have made the same decision.106
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote separately to
emphasize a few points not addressed by the majority’s opinion. One of
these points was that the problem confronted by the Court could be
avoided in the future based upon advance directives.107 Specifically, she
noted that decisions such as the one before the Court “might be avoided
if the State considered an equally probative source of evidence: the

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at *2.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 289–90 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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patient’s appointment of a proxy to make health care decisions on her
behalf.”108 She also presciently pointed out that “[d]elegating the
authority to make medical decisions to a family member or friend is
becoming a common method of planning for the future.”109
Justice O’Connor observed that some states had started to allow
agents appointed via durable power of attorney to make health care
decisions while others “allow an individual to designate a proxy to
carry out the intent of a living will.”110 Assessing these developments,
Justice O’Connor concluded that “[t]hese procedures for surrogate
decisionmaking, which appear to be rapidly gaining in acceptance, may
be a valuable additional safeguard of the patient’s interest in directing
his medical care.”111
B. The Patient Self-Determination Act
1. INTRODUCTION
In large part based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan,
Congress passed the bipartisan Patient Self-Determination Act112
(“PSDA”) in November 1990.113 Under the PSDA, any health care
providers receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments must provide
written information to patients regarding their rights under the law of
the state in which the facility is located.114 This disclosure must include
written information about the right “to make decisions concerning such
medical care, including the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical
treatment and the right to formulate advance directives.”115 It also must
include written information about “the written policies of the provider
or organization respecting the implementation of such rights.”116
Importantly, this written information must be provided:
(A) in the case of a hospital, at the time of the individual’s
admission as an inpatient,
108. Id. at 290 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
109. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 290–91 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 291–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
112. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 §§ 4206, 4751, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395cc(a)(1)(Q), (f), 1395mm(c)(8), 1396a(a)(57), (58), 1396a(w) (2012).
113. Justin Waddell, Dead Letters: Protecting the Intentions of a Living Will
Declarant with a Dedicated Advocate, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801, 806 (2012).
114. Richard E. Shugrue, The Patient Self-Determination Act, 26 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 751, 761–62 (1993).
115. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i).
116. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(ii).
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(B) in the case of a skilled nursing facility, at the time of the
individual’s admission as a resident,
(C) in the case of a home health agency, in advance of the
individual coming under the care of the agency, [and]
(D) in the case of a hospice program, at the time of initial
receipt of hospice care by the individual from the
program . . . .117
After receiving this information, the patient can choose whether to
execute an advance directive, which the PSDA defines as “a written
instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney for health
care, recognized under State law (whether statutory or as recognized by
the courts of the State) and relating to the provision of such care when
the individual is incapacitated.”118 The PSDA requires the health care
facility “to document in a prominent part of the individual’s current
medical record whether or not the individual has executed an advance
directive.”119
2. GOALS OF THE PSDA
a. Pre-asserting rights before isolation
Part of the reason for the passage of the PSDA was the recognition
of the isolation that patients often face when admitted to health care
facilities.120 This isolation is especially acute in cases where patients are
faced with terminal illnesses and end-of-life decisions.121 Indeed, some
have asserted that, “like soldiers and prisoners, they are . . . ‘captives’
of their disease, their physicians and hospital, and their enforced
isolation.”122 Moreover, elderly patients are often “frail, seriously sick,
and socially isolated from the outset of the provider/patient
relationship.”123 In such cases:

117.
118.
119.
120.

§ 1395cc(f)(2).
§ 1395cc(f)(3).
§ 1395cc(f)(1)(B).
See LAWRENCE P. ULRICH, THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT:
MEETING THE CHALLENGES IN PATIENT CARE 104–05 (1999). See generally Elizabeth
McCloskey, Between Isolation and Intrusion: The Patient Self-Determination Act, 19 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 80 (1991).
121. D. Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally Ill: A
Proposal for Heightened Safeguards, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 479, 492
(1999).
122. JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 1053 (1972).
123. Marshall B. Kapp, Malpractice Liability in Long-Term Care: A Changing
Environment, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1235, 1238 (1991).
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The patient may understandably see herself as a burden—as
requiring the family to waste the resources to maintain her in
a painful and virtually incommunicado condition—until the
money, the pain, and the technology is cut off by someone
who neither knows her, nor really cares for her, but cares
only that the medicare check comes in payment.124

By allowing a patient to pre-assert his health care rights, the PSDA
empowers the patient to make important decisions “when the patient is
healthy and before she ‘experiences the dislocation that often attends
inpatient admission.’”125 At the same time, the PSDA does not seek to
coerce a patient into making certain health care decisions. During the
Senate debate on the PSDA, an American Bar Association spokesperson
expressed concern “for the indigent, poorly educated and isolated
individuals who could be vulnerable to facile execution of documents
urged upon them by over-enthusiastic caretakers.”126 In response, the
PSDA was written so that health care providers merely provide patients
with information about advance directives, not the directives
themselves.127
b. Overcoming the secrecy of the physician-patient relationship
The physician-patient relationship is traditionally shrouded in
secrecy based upon a nexus of laws ensuring confidentiality.128
Collectively, these laws “shield doctor-patient interactions from the
scrutiny of the outside world, thereby ensuring that the doctor’s
influence will go unmitigated and undetected.”129 Indeed, in the
end-of-life context, “several commentators have concluded that the

124. Paul J. Zwier, Looking for a Nonlegal Process: Physician-Assisted Suicide
and the Care Perspective, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 199, 223 (1996).
125. Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaption of Miranda to Advance
Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 9
HEALTH MATRIX 139, 153 (1999) (quoting Susan M. Wolf et al., Sources of Concern
About the Patient Self-Determination Act, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1666, 1667 (1991)).
126. Living Wills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Medicare and Long-term
Care of the S. Comm. on Fin., 101st Cong. 42 (1990) (statement of Charles P.
Sabatino, Assistant Director, Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, American
Bar Association).
127. See Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advanced
Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 249, 265 (1997).
128. Patrick M. Curran, Jr., Note, Regulating Death: Oregon’s Death with
Dignity Act and the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 86 GEO. L.J. 725, 740
(1998).
129. Id. at 740–41.
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privacy of this relationship renders effective regulation of
[physician-assisted suicide] impossible.”130
The PSDA addresses this issue in two meaningful ways. First, it
ensures that, if end-of-life “disputes arise . . . patients or their
decision-makers and physicians will have a summary of patients’ rights
under state law to make life-sustaining medical treatment decisions.”131
Second, it facilitates the execution of advance directives, ensuring that
there will be a written record of their wishes that will be known and
honored by health care providers.132
c. Counteracting the unfamiliarity of health care facilities
The PSDA recognizes that patients being admitted into health care
facilities can become disoriented based upon the unfamiliarity of the
new staff and surroundings confronting them.133 The unfamiliar
surroundings facing a patient upon admission make a health care facility
a difficult place for patients to decide to execute advance directives.134
The PSDA, however, facilitates the execution of advance directives
“when the patient is healthy and before she ‘experiences the dislocation
that often attends inpatient admission.’”135
d. Preventing coercion
The PSDA was passed in large part to address the coercion that a
patient can face when receiving medical care, especially in cases

130. Id. at 741; see also Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of
Physician-Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1996) (“If it is true, as it indubitably is, that ‘decisions about medical
treatment are normally made in the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship,’ then an
obvious question must be asked: how is it possible, or could it ever be possible, to
monitor and regulate those decisions regarding PAS that occur within the ambit of that
privacy?” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating
Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119, 119 (1994))).
131. Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating
End-of-Life Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships,
79 B.U. L. REV. 1091, 1126 (1999).
132. Charles P. Sabatino, National Advance Directives: One Attempt to Scale
the Barriers, 1 NAELA J. 131, 135 (2005).
133. Marni J. Lerner, Note, State Natural Death Acts: Illusory Protection of
Individuals’ Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 210
n.180 (1992).
134. Tara Rayne Shewchuk, Completing Advance Directives for Health Care
Decisions: Getting to Yes, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 703, 713–14 (1998).
135. Pope, supra note 125, at 153 (quoting Wolf et al., supra note 125,
at 1667).
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involving possible end-of-life care.136 Many have argued that the
physician-patient relationship is “inherently coercive” because “the
balance of power between doctor and patient is almost entirely
one-sided.”137 Others have noted that the physician-patient relationship
is rife with actual coercion because “physicians manipulate the consent
process to obtain the result they desire by the tone and sequence in
which they convey the risk information . . . .”138 Moreover, the
Supreme Court itself has recognized that end-of-life situations are
especially rife with the risk of coercion.139 Finally, coercion is a
concern throughout the field of advance directives and not limited to
fear of doctor or hospital staff coercion. Some mental health advocates
fear that family members may coerce persons with mental illness into
signing advance directives, consenting to treatment they do not want.
On the other hand, mental health professionals fear that advocates will
persuade the mentally ill to reject both needed and wanted prospective
treatment.140
The PSDA addresses these concerns by informing patients about
their health care rights so that they can choose whether to execute
documents like advance directives before their condition deteriorates
and they are more susceptible to heightened pressures from a variety of
sources.141
e. Promoting autonomy
The PSDA was primarily passed because of the belief that patients
were unable to exercise autonomy in making health care decisions
under the existing framework.142 Specifically, most patients “cannot
exercise even a semblance of autonomy about where they will spend
136. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 267 (noting how one of the goals
of the PSDA was to empower patients and alleviate concerns about coercion).
137. Curran, supra note 128, at 740.
138. Mark A. Hall, Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV.
511, 570 n.178 (1997).
139. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) (construing Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)).
140. Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One’s
Say?, 89 KY. L.J. 327, 374–75 (2000).
141. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 265; Ben Kusmin, Note, Swing
Low, Sweet Chariot: Abandoning the Disinterested Witness Requirement for Advance
Directives, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 93, 99 (2006); Ruth F. Maron, Note, Who Has a Will
to Live?: Why State Requirements for Advance Directives Should be Uniform(ly
Revised), 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 169, 193 (2011); Lester J. Perling, Comment, Health
Care Advance Directives: Implications for Florida Mental Health Patients, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 193, 226–27 (1993).
142. See, e.g., John F. Peppin, Physician Neutrality and Patient Autonomy in
Advance Directive Decisions, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 13, 15 (1995).
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their final days because such decisions are often fraught with coercion
and fiscal pressures.”143 Indeed, patient autonomy was the primary
principle guiding the creation of the PSDA.144
The PSDA was passed based on the recognition that informing
patients of their health care rights after they have been admitted is often
too late to allow them to effectively understand and assert those
rights.145 By providing information at an earlier stage, the PSDA allows
patients to engage in advance planning that “avoids the need for state
coercion and incompetency adjudication with its accompanying labeling
effects while preserving the individual’s sense of dignity and
autonomy.”146
The PSDA is directed more toward “the process of decisionmaking
rather than the decision itself.”147 The intent behind the PSDA was “to
give patients accurate and uniform information without creating undue
anxiety or pressuring them to execute documents they either did not
understand or genuinely want.”148 Because it requires health care
providers to supply information concerning health care rights at an
early stage, it ensures that patients are “allowed to make their own
decisions about the use or nonuse of advance directives.”149
3. MEDICAL MIRANDA
The PSDA has frequently been described as “medical Miranda.”150
Indeed, co-sponsor John C. Danforth introduced the PSDA as an act
143. Arthur L. Caplan, Commentary: Can the Case Manager Offer Placement
in Good Conscience?, in ETHICAL CONFLICT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF HOME CARE: THE
CASE MANAGER’S DILEMMA 133, 136 (Rosalie A. Kane & Arthur L. Caplan eds.,
1993); see also Pope, supra note 125, at 158.
144. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 257; William M. Sage,
Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1705 n.9 (1999) (“For example, autonomy concerns led to the
passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) . . . .”).
145. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 264 (quoting an American
Hospital Association representative who stated during the debate on the PSDA that
“[a]s a practical matter in many cases when the patient arrives at the hospital it is too
late really to effectively deal with the situation”).
146. Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the
Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 6, 39 (1995).
147. Paul F. Stavis, The Nexum: A Modest Proposal for Self-Guardianship by
Contract: A System of Advance Directives and Surrogate Committees-at-Large for the
Intermittently Mentally Ill, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 53 (1999) (quoting
Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 267).
148. Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 267.
149. Id.
150. Pope, supra note 125, at 142; see also Fred H. Cate, Implementing the
Education Mandate of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 7 HEALTH LAW., Fall 1993,
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that would create “health care’s own Miranda warning.”151 The analogy
makes sense because it requires medical providers to inform patients of
their health care rights just like criminal Miranda obligates police
officers to advise suspects of their right to counsel and their right to
remain silent.152
III. MIRANDA REVISITED
A. Introduction
In its dicta in McNeil, the Supreme Court expressed skepticism
about extending the Edwards prophylaxis to cover pre-assertions of
Miranda rights for two primary reasons. First, the Court noted that
most rights cannot be asserted until “the government seeks to take the
action they protect against.”153 Second, the Court feared that it could
place no meaningful limitations on the pre-assertion of the Miranda
right to counsel if it approved such pre-assertion.154 Instead, the
Miranda right to counsel could be asserted “by a letter prior to arrest”
or “prior to identification as a suspect,” with the police subsequently
unable to interrogate the suspect in perpetuity.155
This section addresses this dicta and makes four arguments in
favor of extending the Edwards prophylaxis to cover pre-assertions of
Miranda rights. Part B of this section argues that the same principles
at 11, 13 (“How do we keep the Act from becoming what has already been called a
‘medical Miranda,’ whose very familiarity causes patients to ignore its meaning and
importance?”); Paul Cotton, Providers to Advise of ‘Medical Miranda,’ 265 JAMA 306
(1991); Michael A. Refolo, The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990: Health Care’s
Own Miranda, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455 (1992); Lerner, supra note 133,
at 179 (noting that the PSDA is “[r]eferred to as a ‘medical Miranda warning’”); Doug
Podolsky, A Right to Die Reminder: A New Law Requires Hospitals to Read You Your
Medical Rights, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1991, at 74 (noting that health
care facilities must provide patients with a written “medical Miranda” outlining their
health care rights); Leonard Sloane, ‘91 Law Says Failing Patients Must be Told of
Their Options, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1990, at A4.
151. See Pope, supra note 125, at 142 n.11 (noting that “Senator John C.
Danforth of Missouri introduced the bill this way”).
152. John D. Gorby, Viewing the “Draft Guidelines for State Court Decision
Making in Authorizing or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment” from the
Perspective of Related Areas of Law and Economics: A Critique, 7 ISSUES L. & MED.
477, 508 (1992) (“It has been described as a health care ‘Miranda warning’ because it
informs patients about their basic rights to refuse treatment.”); Sloane, supra note 150.
153. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991).
154. Id.
155. Such a concern would not be present with pre-assertion of the right to
remain silent because that right merely needs to be “scrupulously honored,” allowing
for officers to seek to interrogate the suspect hours later. See supra notes 37–39 and
accompanying text.
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supporting the pre-assertion of health care rights that led to the passage
of the PSDA justify legal recognition of the pre-assertion of Miranda
rights. Part C of this section contends that courts have already laid the
framework for pre-assertion of Miranda rights in a way that allows for
equitable and meaningful limitations to be placed on pre-assertion. Part
D of this section asserts that the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in
Maryland v. Shatzer156 quells concerns that authorizing pre-assertions
would hinder police investigations in perpetuity. Finally, Part E of this
section notes that the Supreme Court has recently created an important
limitation on the principles at the heart of the Edwards prophylaxis that
supports its extension to certain pre-assertions of Miranda rights.
B. The Similar Justifications for Criminal and Medical Miranda
1. ASSERTING RIGHTS BEFORE ISOLATION
The Miranda opinion was based to a large extent on the fact that
most custodial interrogations take place “in the isolated setting of the
police station,” with the suspect being incommunicado, i.e., unable to
communicate with others besides his interrogators.157 The Miranda
Court began by noting that each of the cases before it involved
“incommunicado interrogations of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere . . . .”158 The Court observed that the largely
incommunicado nature of most custodial interrogations keeps “what
transpires at such interrogations” largely under wraps and also cited to
a myriad of cases in which it previously uncovered police extortion of
confessions via physical violence and “sustained and protracted
questioning incommunicado . . . .”159
Later, the Court focused on three prior cases in which it reversed
convictions because police engaged in mental rather than physical
coercion during custodial interrogation.160 With regard to these
interrogations, the Court concluded that, “[i]n other settings, these
individuals might have exercised their constitutional rights. In the
incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere, they succumbed.”161 The
Court later found a suspect’s inability to speak with others (or his lack
of knowledge of that ability) inconsistent with the privilege against
156. 559 U.S. 98 (2010).
157. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
158. Id. at 445.
159. Id. at 445–46.
160. Id. at 456 (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
161. Id.
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self-incrimination, noting that “[t]he current practice of incommunicado
interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished
principles—that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate
himself.”162
In terms of isolation, the Court pointed out that police manuals
instruct officers “[t]o highlight the isolation and unfamiliar
surroundings” of a stationhouse custodial interrogation.163 The Court
thereafter determined that these practices are effective because, “[a]s a
practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the
police station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard
against intimidation or trickery.”164 Finally, the Court tied both the
isolation and incommunicado strands of its analysis together,
concluding that the government bears the heavy burden of proving
subsequent waiver after a suspect who previously asserted his right to
remain silent or right to an attorney subsequently waived that right.165
From the Court’s perspective, “[s]ince the State is responsible for
establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation
takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated
evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the
burden is rightly on its shoulders.”166
In its subsequent opinion in United States v. Washington,167 the
Court succinctly explained that “[a]ll Miranda’s safeguards, which are
designed to avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing
compulsion which the Court thought was caused by isolation of a
suspect in police custody.”168
2. OVERCOMING THE SECRECY OF THE
POLICE OFFICER–SUSPECT RELATIONSHIP
Because most suspects are incommunicado during isolated
custodial interrogations at stationhouses, there is a privacy and secrecy
that shrouds the process. The Miranda Court observed that
“[i]nterrogation still takes place in privacy.”169 According to the Court,
this “[p]rivacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 475.
Id.
431 U.S. 181 (1977).
Id. at 187 n.5.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.

2015:863

Cloning Miranda

885

knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”170
The Court again referenced police manuals, which inform officers “that
the ‘principal psychological factor contributing to a successful
interrogation is privacy—being alone with the person under
interrogation.’”171 The privacy and secrecy of the process led the Court
to conclude that preliminary advice by an attorney is insufficient;
instead, upon request, counsel must be present throughout a custodial
interrogation because “[e]ven preliminary advice given to the accused
by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation
process.”172
According to at least one source, “[t]he Miranda Court’s greatest
concern was the inherent coercion in incommunicado interrogation that
arises from the privacy and secrecy of” custodial interrogations.173
3. COUNTERACTING THE UNFAMILIARITY OF THE STATIONHOUSE
While officers are required to give the Miranda warning whenever
and wherever they subject suspects to custodial interrogation, the
Miranda Court’s opinion was born out of four cases in which police
conducted interrogations within the four walls of the stationhouse.
According to the Court, in each of the cases before it, “the defendant
was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing
police interrogation procedures.”174 As previously noted, the Miranda
Court cited to police manuals, which instructed officers “[t]o highlight
the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings” of a stationhouse custodial
interrogation.175 The Court then went on to explain that
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in
the investigator’s office or at least in a room of his own
choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological
advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant,
or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and
more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions of criminal behavior
within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other
friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In
his office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 449 (quoting FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1 (1962)).
172. Id. at 470.
173. Lorraine J. Adler, New York’s Loyalty to the Spirit of Miranda: Simply the
Best for Twenty-Five Years, 47 VAND. L. REV. 889, 896 (1994).
174. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
175. Id. at 450.
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atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the
law.176

As the Supreme Court later noted in Minnesota v. Murphy,177
“[m]any of the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on
the suspect’s unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment.”178
4. PREVENTING COERCION
Given the aura of invincibility surrounding “the forces of the law,”
it is unsurprising that the Miranda Court deemed custodial
interrogations inherently coercive. The Court deemed the Miranda
warning necessary “to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings . . . .”179 Later, the Court found that custodial
interrogation without the Miranda warning “contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely.”180 The Court then restated this conclusion even more
forcefully, finding that the Miranda warning is “an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere.”181 The Miranda dissent put it the most concisely,
characterizing the majority’s position as declaring that “in-custody
interrogation is inherently coercive,”182 a characterization that the Court
has often repeated.183
The Court’s conclusion in Miranda rested not merely on the
coercion inherent in custodial interrogation but also on the actual
coercive techniques that law enforcement officials are taught to apply
while questioning suspects. As noted, some of these techniques involve
isolating the suspect within the four walls of the stationhouse and
making sure that the interrogation is conducted incommunicado.184 The
Court also cited to police manuals instructing officers “to display an air

176. Id. at 449–50 (quoting CHARLES O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 99 (1956)).
177. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
178. Id. at 433.
179. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
180. Id. at 467.
181. Id. at 468.
182. Id. at 533 (White, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 645 (2004) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of
custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the
voluntariness of any confession resulting from it.”).
184. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
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of confidence in the suspect’s guilt and from outward appearance to
maintain only an interest in confirming certain details.”185 Additionally,
the Court referenced the recommendation that police officers team up to
interrogate suspects, using the classic “good cop, bad cop”
technique.186 The Court then later concluded:
From these representative samples of interrogation
techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and
observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To
be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and
to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence
in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms
the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe.
Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are
employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must
“patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from
which the desired objective may be attained.”187
5. PROMOTING FREE CHOICE/AUTONOMY
In the end, the Miranda Court combined all of the above factors to
get to the heart of the issue: Law enforcement officers must not conduct
custodial interrogations in a manner that runs afoul of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.188 And, according to
the Court, a custodial interrogation only complies with the Fifth
Amendment privilege if the interrogating officer apprises the suspect of
his right to remain silent as well as his right to an attorney and secures
a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights.189
The purpose, then, of the Miranda warning is to ensure that the
statements that a suspect makes in response to custodial interrogation
are the result of a free and rational waiver of his constitutional rights.
This is a theme that the Miranda majority repeated throughout its
opinion. The Court found none of the four convictions under review to
be constitutionally viable because “in none of these cases did the
officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the
interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free

185. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 (citing INBAU & REID, supra note 171, at
34–43, 87).
186. See id. at 452.
187. Id. at 455 (quoting FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, LIE DETECTION AND
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 185 (3d ed. 1953)).
188. Id. at 444.
189. Id.
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choice.”190 This lack of appropriate safeguards meant that each
defendant was put “in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity
for rational judgment.”191
The Court then found that these concerns were not unique to the
cases before it but instead would apply to any custodial interrogation:
“Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained
from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”192
Therefore, “whatever the background of the person interrogated, a
warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its
pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise
the privilege at that point in time.”193 Moreover, a suspect must
thereafter be able to invoke his right to remain silent and his right to an
attorney “at any time prior to or during questioning” because,
“[w]ithout the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in
producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.”194
As the Southern District of New York later explained in United
States v. Dosanjh,195 Miranda requires “that the autonomy of the
individual not be intimidated, or coerced, or compromised by
ignorance.”196
6. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MIRANDA
Studies conducted over the course of more than four decades have
consistently found that around eighty percent of adults waive their
Miranda rights.197 Three decades of research also supports the empirical
finding that more than ninety percent of juveniles waive their Miranda
rights.198
Many have claimed that the Miranda warning is ineffective
because it “come[s] too late to impose significant constraints on the

190. Id. at 457.
191. Id. at 465.
192. Id. at 458.
193. Id. at 469.
194. Id. at 474.
195. No. 08 Cr. 211(AKH), 2008 WL 5209991 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008).
196. Id. at *5.
197. Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens when Cops
Question Kids, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1, 11 (2013).
198. Id.
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acquisition of evidence from the accused.”199 The Miranda warning is
likely ineffective in large part because it primarily governs custodial
interrogations conducted by detectives, “a small elite in the police force
who can become trained and experienced in minimizing the effect of
Miranda or even using it to their strategic advantage.”200 These
detectives often “give[] considerable thought about how to use such
warnings to their strategic advantage.”201 For instance, some detectives
“preface[] the warnings with an explanation that they were part of the
police’s good-faith attempt to hear the suspect’s side of the story before
deciding whether to bring charges.”202 As a result, when suspects
realize they have said too much, “it [i]s almost always too late.”203
While many have dubbed the PSDA “medical Miranda,”204 the Act
is actually much more efficacious than its criminal counterpart because
it allows patients to assert their health care rights before admission.
Conversely, criminal suspects cannot assert their Miranda rights until
they are subjected to the very process that the Supreme Court has
deemed inherently coercive.205
7. PRE-ASSERTION OF RIGHTS BEFORE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
In McNeil, the Court noted that most rights cannot be asserted until
“the government seeks to take the action they protect against.”206 To the
extent that this statement is true,207 this thinking probably makes sense
for most rights. For instance, why would a citizen need to assert his
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment before
the government seeks to sentence him to the death penalty, life
imprisonment, or some other harsh criminal penalty? Similarly, why
199. Jacqueline Ross, Do Rules of Evidence Apply (Only) in the Courtroom?
Deceptive Interrogation in the United States and Germany, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
443, 449 (2008).
200. Kent Roach & M.L. Friedland, Borderline Justice: Policing in the Two
Niagras, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 241, 295 (1996).
201. Id. at 294.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
206. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991).
207. It is unclear whether the McNeil Court’s statement is in fact accurate. An
argument could be made, for instance, that a citizen who files a petition for a parade or
demonstration is pre-asserting his First Amendment rights before the government seeks
to take contradictory action. Similarly, a party seeking a declaratory judgment
determining whether a private contract might violate constitutional rights could be said
to be pre-asserting his rights. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tri-City & Olympia R.R.,
No. CV-09-5062-EFS, 2011 WL 2607162, at *8–9 (E.D. Wash. July 1, 2011).
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would a citizen need to assert his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by
jury before the government charges him with violating a criminal law?
In either of these cases, it would be nonsensical for the citizen to
pre-assert his rights, and no coercive force would prevent him from
asserting his rights after the government sought to act.
Conversely, both health care and Miranda rights seem to fall into a
different category based upon the unique circumstances surrounding
their assertion. As previously noted, several sources have recognized
the difficulty that both patients and suspects face in asserting their
rights due to factors such as isolation and coercion. Therefore, it makes
sense for both patients and suspects to be able to pre-assert their rights
because the future versions of themselves might not be able to assert
these rights.208
In similar contexts, legislatures have passed laws based upon
exactly this type of thinking. One example of this type of law is a
mandatory arrest law, which requires police officers responding to 911
calls to arrest suspects if they have probable cause to believe that they
committed acts of domestic violence, regardless of whether the alleged
victim consents to the arrest.209 Currently, approximately twenty-two
states have some version of a mandatory arrest law, and many
prosecutors’ offices also have no-drop policies, which “require
prosecution of a domestic violence perpetrator, regardless of the
victim’s wishes . . . .”210
The rationale for these laws and policies are the same as the
rationale for the PSDA: when isolated with her abuser before his arrest
and prosecution, a domestic violence victim might be coerced into not
pressing charges or pursuing the case to trial.211 While many argue that

208. See Stephen J. Dubner, Save Me from Myself: A New Freakonomics Radio
Podcast, FREAKONOMICS (Feb. 2, 2015, 9:24 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2012/02/
02/save-me-from-myself-a-new-freakonomics-radio-podcast/.
209. See, e.g., Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies:
Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159,
161 (2003).
210. Id.; see also Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender
Roles, and Changing Attitudes Toward Female Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 1, 9 (2013).
211. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, A “Neo-Feminist” Assessment of Rape and
Domestic Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583, 601 (2012) (“The
stock argument in support of mandatory arrest and prosecution is seductively logical:
Because batterers coercively control abuse victims by allowing victims to decline arrest,
allowing prosecution essentially cedes power over the criminal process to the
batterer.”); Allison J. Cambria, Note, Defying a Dead End: The Ramifications of Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales on Domestic Violence Law and How the States Can Ensure
Police Enforcement of Mandatory Arrest Statutes, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 155, 165
(2006).
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these laws and policies infringe upon the victim’s autonomy,212 others
claim that they promote the autonomy and empowerment of the victim
by honoring the choice that she made to call 911 rather than her
subsequent decision to drop the case after potentially being subjected to
isolation and coercion.213
These same rationales similarly support the idea that the Edwards
prophylaxis should be extended to allow suspects to pre-assert their
Miranda rights. In Miranda, the Court found the Miranda warning to
be constitutionally mandated to ensure that suspects either assert their
rights or execute a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those
rights.214 But, as used to be the case with domestic violence victims as
well as patients, especially those suffering from potentially terminal
illnesses, there is a real danger that their ultimate decisions will be
involuntary based upon a combination of factors such as isolation and
coercion.215
C. Applying the Existing Miranda Framework to Allow
for Pre-Assertion
1. INVOCATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS WHEN INTERROGATION
IS “IMMINENT”
Assuming that courts accept the general theory that the Edwards
prophylaxis should be extended to cover some pre-assertions of
Miranda rights, there is a remaining question over where to draw the
212. See, e.g., Dennis P. Saccuzzo, How Should the Police Respond to
Domestic Violence: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandatory Arrest, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765, 777 (1999) (“For example, critics have argued that
mandatory arrest strips the battered person of her autonomy.”).
213. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriage at the Millennium, 33 FAM.
L.Q. 647, 656 (1999); Arthur L. Rizer III, Mandatory Arrest: Do We Need to Take a
Closer Look?, 36 UWLA L. REV. 1, 13 (2005) (“In essence, he argues that mandatory
arrest promotes the autonomy and empowerment of women.”).
214. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
215. Indeed, the argument for pre-assertion of medical and criminal Miranda
rights is much stronger than the argument that mandatory arrest laws bolster victim
autonomy. Mandatory arrest laws prevent a victim from changing her mind. An
advance directive merely indicates a patient’s wishes at the time of execution; nothing
prevents the patient from amending or withdrawing such a directive if he changes his
mind while of sound mind. See, e.g., Daryl L. Miller, Comment, Legal Killing: The
Imminent Legalization of a Physician’s Affirmative Aid-in-Dying, 34 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 663, 708 (1994). Similarly, if a suspect were allowed to pre-assert his Miranda
rights, nothing would prevent him from reinitiating communications with the police.
Furthermore, if a suspect pre-asserted his Miranda right to counsel, nothing would
prevent the police from interrogating him once counsel was appointed. See supra note
51 and accompanying text.
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line. In McNeil, the Court expressed concern that authorizing
pre-assertion of the Miranda rights could lead to their assertion “by a
letter prior to arrest” or “prior to identification as a suspect.”216 The
possibility of such a slippery slope could be reason not to authorize
pre-assertion because it could “unduly hamper[] the gathering of
information.”217
It appears, however, that a mechanism is already in place for
courts to approve of a more incremental extension of the Edwards
prophylaxis to cover only certain pre-assertions. As noted, courts
across the country have used the McNeil dicta to conclude that Miranda
rights cannot be invoked “in a context other than ‘custodial
interrogation.’”218 That said, both federal219 and state courts220 across
the country have held that individuals can assert their Miranda rights
either during custodial interrogation or “when an interrogation is
imminent.”221 In other words, many courts have concluded that
pre-assertion of the Miranda rights when interrogation is “imminent” is
an assertion made in the context of custodial interrogation.222
Despite this language, however, courts have applied an extremely
narrow construction to the word “imminent,” which has only allowed
suspects to invoke their Miranda rights “in response to or just before
interrogation.”223 For instance, in Hoerauf v. State,224 the defendant
asked to speak to an attorney both while he was being fingerprinted
during booking and while being placed in a holding cell hours before
being taken to an interrogation room.225 Eventually, the defendant was
taken to the interrogation room, waived his Miranda rights, and
confessed.226 In finding that the trial court properly denied the
216. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991).
217. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994).
218. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1147 n.3 (10th Cir.
1998); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 339 (7th Cir. 1994).
220. See, e.g., Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla. 1997); People v.
Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ill. 2000).
221. Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1249 (3d Cir. 1994).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“We find the reasoning of our fellow circuits persuasive and hold that Miranda rights
may be invoked only during custodial interrogation or when interrogation is
imminent.”).
223. LaGrone, 43 F.3d at 340; see also State v. Appleby, 221 P.3d 525, 546
(Kan. 2009) (“Other courts have been very restrictive in defining ‘imminent,’ allowing
no intervening activity between the invocation of the right and the planned initiation of
questioning.”).
224. Hoerauf v. State, 941 A.2d 1161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
225. Id. at 1167–68.
226. Id. at 1165–67.
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defendant’s motion to suppress, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland cited its prior opinion in Marr v. State,227 which in turn cited
five federal courts in support of the proposition that Miranda rights can
be asserted during actual or imminent custodial interrogation.228 The
court, however, concluded that the defendant did not invoke his right to
counsel when custodial interrogation was imminent; instead, “all such
requests were made by appellant prior to being placed in the
interrogation room and questioned by Detective Sofelkanik.”229
Similarly, in Pardon v. State,230 Raymond Pardon asked to speak
to an attorney after he was arrested and being booked into detention on
the same charge that would lead to his custodial interrogation.231 The
District Court of Appeal of Florida held that he had not validly invoked
his right to counsel because the interrogation of Pardon was not
imminent.232 He was merely being booked into detention, albeit on the
same charge on which he was later questioned.233 Questioning did not
occur until a few hours later.234 Any request for an attorney at this point
was an anticipatory invocation of his Miranda rights, which would not
prevent the officers from later reading him his rights preparatory to
interrogation.235
Indeed, in applying a limited construction to the word “imminent,”
the Third Circuit in Alston v. Redmond236 was only able to find two
cases applying a somewhat broader construction of the word.237 Even
these cases, however, did not apply expansive definitions of the word
“imminent.”
In United States v. Kelsey,238 Joseph Kelsey asked to see his
attorney three or four times after being arrested in his home.239 The
227. Hoerauf, 941 A.2d at 1175 (citing Marr v. State, 759 A.2d 327 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2000)).
228. Marr, 759 A.2d at 339 (citing United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342,
1347–48 (11th Cir. 1998); LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332; United States v. Thompson, 35 F.3d
100 (2d Cir. 1994); Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Wright, 962 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1992)).
229. Hoerauf, 941 A.2d at 1175.
230. 930 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
231. Id. at 703.
232. Id. at 703–04.
233. Id. at 703.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 703–04.
236. 34 F.3d 1237 (3d Cir. 1994).
237. Id. at 1248–49 (“We recognize that some courts, post-McNeil, have found
a proper invocation of the Miranda right to counsel when a suspect has requested
counsel prior to interrogation or to the reading of the Miranda rights.”).
238. 951 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991).
239. Id. at 1198.
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police, however, “did not question Kelsey at this point and did not read
him his Miranda warnings until much later.”240 Later, Kelsey was read
the Miranda warning at his home, waived his Miranda rights, and
confessed.241 The Tenth Circuit honored Kelsey’s pre-assertion of his
Miranda rights, concluding that Kelsey was in “precisely the type of
coercive atmosphere that generates the need for application of the
Edwards rule” when he was arrested in his home.242
In State v. Torres,243 the defendant was arrested for murdering her
husband.244 She was subsequently detained in the conference room of
the Sheriff’s Department from 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., whereupon she
was taken to the sheriff’s office and told that she would be questioned
shortly.245 The defendant asked to speak to counsel twice while in the
conference room and once when taken to the sheriff’s office.246 When
she was eventually questioned at 10:35 p.m., however, she waived her
Miranda rights and confessed.247 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
found that the defendant had validly invoked her Miranda right because
“[i]t would make little sense to require a defendant already in custody
to wait until the onset of questioning or the recitation of her Miranda
rights before being permitted to invoke her right to counsel.”248
While most courts have narrowly construed the term “imminent,”
at least one court has applied a more expansive construction. In State v.
Hambly,249 Detectives Rindt and Clausing approached Scott Hambly “in
a parking lot outside his apartment and attempted to convince him to
speak to them without their taking him into custody.”250 In response,
Hambly repeatedly refused to speak, prompting Detective Rindt to
place him under arrest.251 As Rindt shepherded Hambly to his squad
car, Hambly “said that he wanted to speak to an attorney.”252 Rindt
responded by placing Hambly “in the back of the car and told him that
he could call an attorney once they arrived at the Washington County
Jail.”253 Later, Hambly was read the Miranda warning, waived his
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1199.
412 S.E.2d 20 (N.C. 1992).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 21, 25.
Id. at 26.
745 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. 2008).
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Miranda rights, and made a confession.254 The trial court eventually
denied Hambly’s motion to suppress his confession, and Hambly was
ultimately convicted of delivery of cocaine.255
In addressing Hambly’s subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin concluded that a suspect can assert his Miranda rights when
custodial interrogation is “imminent or impending.”256 In finding that
Hambly asserted his Miranda right to counsel when interrogation was
imminent or impending, the court used the following reasoning:
In the minutes leading up to the defendant’s request for
counsel, Detective Rindt made it clear that he intended to
question the defendant. The defendant could have reasonably
surmised that because Rindt was persistent in wanting to
interrogate him, Rindt would continue to attempt to
interrogate him in a custodial setting after he refused to speak
with Rindt in a noncustodial setting. The defendant had no
reason to believe that Rindt’s eagerness to question him
dissipated once Rindt took him into custody.257
Hambly thus shows how most courts could easily apply the
existing Miranda framework to allow for pre-assertions of Miranda
rights by simply applying a broader definition of the word “imminent.”
That said, the court’s opinion in Hambly was anything but easy. The
court floated but rejected the possibility that a suspect should be able to
assert his Miranda rights “any time the suspect is in custody, even
before Miranda warnings or the onset of questioning.”258 The court also
surveyed every case which had found that a suspect could invoke his
Miranda rights when custodial interrogation was imminent but
determined that none of these cases actually set forth a standard for
defining imminence.259 Ultimately, the court concluded “that an
interrogation is impending or imminent if a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have believed that interrogation was
imminent or impending.”260
Hambly therefore illustrates another reason why courts could
refuse to extend the Edwards prophylaxis to pre-assertions of Miranda
rights. Currently, according to nearly all courts, suspects can only
assert their Miranda rights during or just before custodial interrogation,
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 57.
Id.
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which is the same point in time when the police must administer the
Miranda warning. The argument could thus be made that allowing
suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights would require courts to
create a second test that is different from the test for determining when
officers must administer the Miranda warning. Such an argument,
however, would be misguided because courts can determine whether a
suspect can pre-assert his Miranda rights by using the same test that
they already apply for deciding whether an officer can pre-administer
the Miranda warning.
2. THE ABILITY OF OFFICERS TO PRE-ADMINISTER THE
MIRANDA WARNING

A year after the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Hambly, it
handed down its decision in State v. Grady.261 In Grady, Marchand
Grady voluntarily went to the police station to discuss the murder of
Allen Jemison.262 Upon arrival at 8:16 p.m., Grady was indisputably
not in custody when Detective Corbett began questioning him about the
murder; nonetheless, “Detective Corbett began the interview by
administering Miranda warnings to Grady so as to be ‘better safe than
sorry,’ and Grady indicated that he understood the rights he was
read.”263
At 10:45 p.m., another suspect being questioned separately said
that Grady killed Jemison, resulting in Grady being placed under
arrest.264 At this point, “Miranda warnings were not readministered to
Grady,” who made several inculpatory statements.265 Before trial,
Grady moved to suppress his post-arrest statements, but the court
denied his motion, and he was ultimately convicted of murder.266
On appeal, Grady asked the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to adopt
a “bright-line rule,” pursuant to which “any and all Miranda warnings
prior to custody [are] ipso facto ineffective.”267 The court declined to
adopt this bright-line rule and instead applied the totality of the
circumstances test utilized by “the overwhelming majority of other
courts who have considered this question.”268 Under this test, courts
determine whether the pre-administration of the Miranda warning

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

766 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 2009).
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id. at 732.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
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before custody and the failure to re-administer the warning immediately
before custodial interrogation is unconstitutional by looking at multiple
factors,
including whether the same officer or officers conducted the
questioning, whether the location changed, whether the
subject matter of the questioning was consistent, whether a
reminder of the Miranda rights was given before the custodial
interrogation began, whether the suspect was mentally or
emotionally impaired, whether more coercive tactics were
used when the suspect was placed in custody, the suspect’s
past experience with law enforcement, and how much time
elapsed between the administration of the Miranda warnings
and the custodial interrogation or confession.269
In its opinion, the Grady court cited to a laundry list of opinions
from courts around the country, each of which found that the
pre-administration of the Miranda warning hours before custodial
interrogation was constitutional, even when the warning was not
re-administered immediately before custodial interrogation.270 The court
then agreed with this analysis, noting that the goal of Miranda is “to
inform the suspect that the interrogators will recognize his or her rights
if exercised” and “ensure that a confession is free and
unconstrained.”271 According to the court,
Given this purpose, a rule that assumes a suspect is a
blank slate with no awareness of his or her rights as soon as
he or she is placed in custody is a head-in-the-sand approach.
In addition, application of Grady’s bright-line rule would
focus the analysis on the custody status of a suspect rather
than on the individual’s comprehension and waiver of his
rights. It is, in short, form over substance. A rule that says
warnings given one minute before custody are ineffective per
se because they were not given when the suspect was actually
in custody is manifestly unreasonable.272
In addition to finding that a bright-line rule against
pre-administration betrayed Miranda’s primary purpose, the court
concluded that

269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 735–36.
Id. at 734 n.6.
Id. at 736.
Id.
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beyond its lack of fidelity to the purposes and principles
behind Miranda, Grady’s approach is unworkable. One of its
major flaws is that it assumes that the precise point of custody
is fixed and known at the time of questioning. While this may
sometimes be the case, it is not always true. In practice, it is
not always clear when a suspect is officially under arrest.273

These lines of analysis by the court were eminently reasonable and
similar to the analysis conducted by other courts on the issue.274
Conversely, this analysis lays bare the unreasonableness of courts
failing to allow suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights. If courts are
unwilling to treat suspects like a blank slate at the start of custodial
interrogation, why do they treat pre-assertions of Miranda rights as if
they were written on Etch-a-Sketches simply because they were made
before the technical definition of custodial interrogation? If the lack of
clarity over when a suspect is technically in custody justifies allowing
officers to pre-administer the Miranda warning, why are suspects, who
have much less familiarity with the legal definition of custody, not
similarly able to pre-assert their Miranda rights?
This Article thus proposes a test based on reciprocity and
equanimity: Suspects should be allowed to pre-assert their Miranda
rights under the same circumstances that officers are allowed to
pre-administer the Miranda warning. In other words, if the totality of
the circumstances supports a finding that an officer could
pre-administer the Miranda warning, the same totality of the
circumstances should support a finding that the suspect could pre-assert
his Miranda rights.
For example, consider the outcomes in the following two cases:
First, in People v. Petrone,275 Officer Roy Rodriguez responded to a
911 call regarding a robbery of money and jewelry at the house of
Hazel Hudson.276 Later, about a mile and a half away from Hudson’s
house, Officer Rodriguez pulled over a car driven by John Petrone.277
Petrone consented to a search of his vehicle, which led to Officer
Rodriguez discovering jewelry and $600 in cash.278 Officer Rodriguez
did not arrest Petrone but did read him the Miranda warning and asked
him about the jewelry.279 Petrone responded that the jewelry belonged

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id.
No. F048289, 2006 WL 1321155 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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to his mother and was in his car because he was in the process of
moving and did not want it to get stolen.280
Officer Rodriguez then arrested Petrone and took him to the police
station, where he subjected him to a custodial interrogation one hour
and fifteen minutes later; Rodriguez never re-administered the Miranda
warning.281 In finding no issue with the trial court’s denial of Petrone’s
motion to suppress the statement he made during custodial
interrogation, the appellate court applied the totality of the
circumstances test.282 According to the court, “the effectiveness of
appellant’s initial waiver was not reduced by the one hour and fifteen
minutes between when appellant was first Mirandized and when he was
subsequently interrogated at the police station.”283
Second, in United States v. Stanley,284 Trooper Jay Poppe pulled
over Leon Stanley for speeding.285 While conducting the traffic stop,
Trooper Poppe noted some irregularities, such as the fact that Stanley’s
rental car had aftermarket tires and wheels.286 After being questioned
about the nature of his trip, Stanley responded, “[T]his is all because of
what happened in Missouri, isn’t it?”287 When Trooper Poppe asked
about Missouri, Stanley responded that he had been arrested with
fourteen pounds of marijuana.288 Trooper Poppe asked for consent to
search Stanley’s vehicle, but Stanley refused to give consent.289
Trooper Poppe then told Stanley that he believed he was engaged
in criminal activity and that he was detaining him pending the arrival of
a narcotics-detection dog.290 Stanley demanded to speak to an attorney
on several occasions, but Trooper Poppe answered that Stanley did not
have any right to counsel because he was merely being detained, not
arrested.291 About half an hour later, the dog arrived and alerted to the
trunk, leading to discovery of a gun but no drugs.292
At this point, Poppe placed Stanley under arrest and read him the
Miranda warning.293 Stanley responded “that he had already requested,
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id. at *2, *6–7.
Id.
Id.
No. 4:08CR3086, 2009 WL 2105676 (D. Neb. July 13, 2009).
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
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and been denied, a lawyer.”294 Trooper Poppe responded that “he was
denied a lawyer while being detained, but now he is now under
arrest.”295 Stanley waived his Miranda rights and later made
incriminatory statements when interrogated in an interview room at
traffic headquarters.296 The court later denied Stanley’s motion to
suppress his statements, citing McNeil’s dicta about suspects not being
able to invoke their Miranda rights anticipatorily in a context other than
custodial interrogation.297
Given the factual similarity between Petrone and Stanley, it seems
clear that the court would have had no problem with Trooper Poppe
pre-administering the Miranda warning after calling for the
narcotics-detection dog and failing to re-administer the Miranda
warning before engaging in subsequent custodial interrogation.
Therefore, the same dispensation should have been given to Stanley,
allowing him to pre-assert his Miranda rights at the same point in time.
The same analysis could also be done in other contexts. For
instance, courts have found that officers can pre-administer the
Miranda warning while asking suspects for consent to search.298
Therefore, despite current precedent to the contrary,299 courts should
find that suspects can pre-assert their Miranda rights when being asked
to consent to searches. Because courts have allowed officers to
pre-administer the Miranda warning before suspects take polygraph
examinations,300 suspects should be able to pre-assert their Miranda
rights at this same time, even if the Miranda warning is not given in
connection with polygraph testing.301

294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at *6.
298. See, e.g., United States v. Young, No. 10-CR-6211L, 2012 WL 5245305,
at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2012) (“In addition to advising him of his Miranda rights,
the agents also informed Young that he did not have to consent to the search, and they
explained and read the consent form to Young.”).
299. See, e.g., United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1994)
(“LaGrone could not have invoked his Miranda right to counsel at the time he asked to
call his attorney concerning the consent to search.”).
300. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, No. M2002-01798-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL
1462649, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2004) (“[T]he defendant contends that
because he was given no further Miranda warnings following the polygraph
examination and change in status of the interrogation, his subsequent statements to the
police should have been suppressed.”).
301. Cf. State v. Nightingale, 58 A.3d 1057, 1064 (Me. 2012) (“Because the
trial court did nor [sic] err in concluding that Nightingale was not in custody during the
interrogation surrounding the polygraph, it follows that Shatzer’s fourteen-day waiting
period does not apply.”).
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Such a reciprocal test is not merely rooted in fairness; it also
means that courts would not have to create any new test for dealing
with pre-assertions of Miranda rights, conserving judicial resources.
D. The Limited Duration of Miranda Rights
Prior to 2010, critics of expanding the Edwards prophylaxis to
cover pre-assertions could claim that it would hinder police
investigations because it would prevent officers from being able to
interrogate suspects in perpetuity. First, such a criticism would not be
entirely accurate because an officer could still interrogate such a
suspect once he was given counsel or if the suspect himself reinitiated
communications with the officer.302 Indeed, in the aforementioned
Hambly case, in which the suspect pre-asserted his Miranda rights, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin found no constitutional violation because
the suspect himself initiated further communications.303
Second, this criticism is no longer accurate at all after the Supreme
Court’s 2010 opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer. In Shatzer, Michael
Shatzer was in prison for an unrelated crime when he was approached
by a detective about allegations he had abused his son before being
incarcerated.304 Thinking he was being questioned about the unrelated
crime, Shatzer initially waived his Miranda rights but later refused to
speak to the detective without an attorney upon realizing he was being
asked about abusing his son.305 The detective immediately ceased
questioning Shatzer.306 Two and a half years later, another detective
approached Shatzer about the allegations he had abused his son.307 At
this point, Shatzer waived his Miranda rights, failed a polygraph test,
and eventually confessed to the crime.308
Shatzer later moved to suppress his confession, claiming that the
Edwards prophylaxis precluded the detective from interrogating him
once he had invoked his Miranda right to counsel.309 The trial court
302. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (finding that a
suspect who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges,
or conversations with the police”).
303. State v. Hambly, 745 N.W.2d 48, 69–70 (Wis. 2008) (“For the reasons
set forth, we conclude that the defendant ‘initiated’ further communication with
Rindt.”).
304. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 100–01 (2010).
305. Id. at 101.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 101–02.
309. Id. at 102.
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denied Shatzer’s motion to suppress, and the Supreme Court eventually
agreed with this decision.310 First, the Supreme Court held that a return
to the general prison population was a break in “custody,” at least for
Miranda purposes.311 Second, the court held that a break in custody of
at least fourteen days renders the Edwards prophylaxis inapplicable; in
other words, if an officer approaches a suspect at least fourteen days
after he has validly asserted his Miranda right to counsel, the suspect’s
statements are not presumed to be involuntary.312
E. The Edwards Prophylaxis Should Be Extended to
Cover Pre-Assertions
Ultimately, courts deciding whether to expand the Edwards
prophylaxis to cover certain pre-assertions of Miranda rights must
determine whether the benefits of extension outweigh the costs.313 The
primary benefit of the Edwards prophylaxis is that it acts to
“‘[p]reserv[e] the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with
police only through counsel’ by ‘prevent[ing] police from badgering
[him] into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.’”314 Its
secondary benefit is “conserv[ing] judicial resources which would
otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of
voluntariness.”315 Conversely, the costs of the Edwards prophylaxis are
“the in-fact voluntary confessions it excludes from trial, and the
voluntary confessions it deters law enforcement officers from even
trying to obtain.”316 Simply put, courts must determine whether the
number of coerced confessions an expanded Edwards prophylaxis
would exclude justify the number of voluntary confessions the expanded
prophylaxis would prevent.317
In Shatzer, the Court refused to extend the Edwards prophylaxis
because it concluded that the interrogation at issue did not implicate the
“concer[n] that motivated the Edwards line of cases”318: “that the

310. Id. at 102, 112–14.
311. Id. at 112–14.
312. Id. at 110–12.
313. Id. at 106.
314. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291 (1998); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 334, 350 (1990)).
315. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146,
151 (1990)).
316. Id. at 108.
317. Id. at 106.
318. Id. at 115 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 120 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
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suspect will be coerced into saying yes.”319 Instead, the Court
concluded that “there is no reason to believe a suspect will view
confession as ‘the only way to end his interrogation’ when, before the
interrogation begins, he is told that he can avoid it by simply requesting
that he not be interrogated without counsel present—an option that
worked before.”320
Conversely, in cases in which suspects seek to pre-assert their
Miranda rights, their attempts are rebuffed. Indeed, such suspects are
often flatly told that they cannot assert their rights.321 Therefore, when
they are later read the Miranda warning, there is a significant reason to
believe that they will view confessions as the only way to end their
interrogations.
In Davis v. United States,322 the Supreme Court found that a
suspect’s Miranda rights were not violated because the suspect failed to
unequivocally assert them.323 That said, in their opinion concurring in
the judgment, four Justices partially analogized the case before them to
the pre-Miranda opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois,324 in which the
Supreme Court deemed a confession involuntary in large part due to the
fact that the suspect’s preliminary request to speak to an attorney was
denied.325 According to the concurring Justices in Davis, “[w]hen a
suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored . . . ,
he may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not)
as the only way to end his interrogation.”326
In McNeil, the Supreme Court did not deny that allowing suspects
to pre-assert their Miranda rights would preserve the integrity of the
accused’s choice. Instead, it merely worried that extending the Edwards
prophylaxis would not conserve judicial resources because it would be
impossible to place meaningful limitations on the ability of suspects to
pre-assert their Miranda rights.327
This Article, however, has set forth a test that allows courts to put
meaningful limitations on both the front and back end of the process.
On the back end, the Court’s recent opinion in Shatzer means that
officers can interrogate a suspect fourteen days after pre-assertion of
the Miranda right to counsel and even earlier if the suspect re-initiates
319. Id. at 115.
320. Id. (quoting id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
321. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
322. 512 U.S. 452 (1992).
323. Id. at 461–62.
324. Id. at 472–73 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964)).
325. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485.
326. Davis, 512 U.S. at 472–73 (Souter, J., concurring).
327. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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communications or is appointed an attorney.328 Meanwhile, if a suspect
pre-asserts his right to silence, officers must merely “scrupulously
honor” that right.329
On the front end, courts can conserve judicial resources by
determining whether suspects can pre-assert their Miranda rights by
applying the same totality-of-the-circumstances test that they use for
deciding whether officers can pre-administer the Miranda warning.330
Under this test, suspects can only pre-assert their Miranda rights when
custodial interrogation is “imminent,”331 quelling the McNeil Court’s
concern about suspects being able to pre-assert their rights at any point
in time.
Most importantly, the pre-assertion scenario is the opposite of the
scenario the Court confronted in Shatzer. Usually, the Court is
skeptical about a suspect’s decision to speak with authorities after
initially invoking his Miranda rights.332 In Shatzer, the Court was able
to overcome this skepticism based on the belief that a suspect who
successfully asserted his right to counsel would believe he could make
the same choice if officers waited at least fourteen days before
approaching him again.333
In the pre-assertion context, however, a suspect’s initial attempt to
assert his Miranda rights is (currently) rejected. Sometimes, this
rejection consists of the officer saying that the suspect cannot invoke his
Miranda rights;334 other times, this rejection consists of the suspect
immediately being placed under arrest.335 Given these circumstances,
there is little reason to believe that the suspect will think that he can
avoid custodial interrogation by asserting his Miranda rights given that
his prior attempt at assertion did not work.
There is also little reason to believe that a suspect’s decision to
waive his Miranda rights after pre-assertion is the result of anything
other than the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation. In
Shatzer, the Court found that officers could reapproach a suspect

328. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
330. See supra Part III.C.
331. See supra Part III.C.
332. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975) (White, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to
deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities'
insistence to make a statement without counsel's presence may properly be viewed with
skepticism.”).
333. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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fourteen days after he initially asserted his Miranda right to counsel by
using the following reasoning:
When . . . a suspect has been released from his pretrial
custody and has returned to his normal life for some time
before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason
to think that his change of heart regarding interrogation
without counsel has been coerced. He has no longer been
isolated. He has likely been able to seek advice from an
attorney, family members, and friends. And he knows from
his earlier experience that he need only demand counsel to
bring the interrogation to a halt. . . . His change of heart is
less likely attributable to “badgering” than it is to the fact that
further deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him
to believe (rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the
investigation is in his interest. Uncritical extension of
Edwards to this situation would not significantly increase the
number of genuinely coerced confessions excluded. The
“justification for a conclusive presumption disappears when
application of the presumption will not reach the correct result
most of the time.”336
In pre-assertion cases covered by the test proposed in this Article,
none of these factors are present. The “earlier experience” of suspects
in these cases is unsuccessful assertion of Miranda rights, which might
make them believe subsequent attempts at assertion would be futile.
Given that suspects would only be allowed to pre-assert their Miranda
rights when custodial interrogation is “imminent,” these suspects are
not able to return to their normal lives for any period of time.
Therefore, there is no reason to believe that they had a change of heart
regarding waiver and every reason to believe that their confessions are
simply the product of a process that the Supreme Court has deemed
“inherently coercive.”337 Accordingly, legal acknowledgment of
pre-assertions of Miranda rights will likely lead to the correct result
most of the time.
CONCLUSION
In its opinion in Miranda, the Supreme Court required officers to
give what is now known as the Miranda warning so that suspects would
336. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 107–08 (2010) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991)).
337. See supra note 182–83 and accompanying text.
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have a “full opportunity” and a “continuous opportunity” to exercise
their Fifth Amendment rights.338 Decades of empirical data, however,
reveal that this opportunity is illusory, with around eighty percent of
suspects waiving their Miranda rights.339 This Article has identified the
likely reason for this under-assertion: the inability of suspects to
pre-assert their Miranda rights until they are subjected to the very
process that the Supreme Court has described as “inherently
coercive.”340
The unwillingness of courts to honor pre-assertions of Miranda
rights can be traced back to dicta from the Supreme Court’s opinion in
McNeil. The McNeil Court cautioned against crediting pre-assertions
because most rights cannot be anticipatorily asserted and because
meaningful limitations could not be placed upon the right to pre-assert.
This Article has identified the PSDA, the so-called “medical Miranda,”
as a useful analogue that demonstrates how allowing pre-assertion of
certain rights can bolster autonomy and counteract the effects of
coercion and isolation. Given the comparisons between the
physician-patient and officer-suspect relationships, the same principles
that support the pre-assertion of medical Miranda rights also support
the pre-assertion of criminal Miranda rights. Moreover, the framework
is already in place for courts to credit such pre-assertions in an
equitable way that will not strain judicial resources.

338.
339.
340.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
See supra note 182–83 and accompanying text.

